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THE DATA-BROKER THREAT: 
PROPOSING FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO 





Imagine if you will the following hypothetical: An eighteen-year-old  
who recently graduated from high school is arrested in California for 
possession of marijuana.  Under California state law, possession of not 
more than 28.5 grams of marijuana is classified as an infraction and carries 
a maximum punishment of a $100 fine.
1
  The young man pleads guilty and 
timely pays all fines and court fees.  Two years later, in accordance with 
state law, the court destroys any records pertaining to the young man’s 
arrest and conviction.
2
  However, in the interim a company called 
DataBrokerX purchased electronic records from the jurisdiction that was 
holding the young man’s file, including records of the young man’s arrest 
and guilty plea.  Once DataBrokerX purchases the records, it stores the 
information in its private database.
3
  Several years later, the young man 
graduates from college and, without having any other run-ins with the law, 
applies for his first job.  The employer runs a background check through 
DataBrokerX and the young man is not selected for the position because the 
conviction appears on that consumer report.  The employer would never 
know that the conviction was vacated because DataBrokerX obtained the 
young man’s records before the state granted the expungement.4  Also, the 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012. 
1 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).  
2 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.5 (West 2007) (providing that all convictions 
and arrests under § 11357(b) shall not be kept longer than two years after the date of 
conviction, or two years after the date of arrest for arrests not resulting in convictions, and 
that any court or agency having custody of the records shall destroy the records at that time).  
3 See infra Part III for a discussion of the data-broker industry.  “Data broker” refers 
generally to private background check companies and, as used in this Comment, refers to 
those companies that provide information about criminal records obtained from local courts 
or other public records sources. 
4 The term “expungement,” as used herein, refers to the full range of remedies that allow 
for the sealing, purging, or erasure of a criminal conviction. 
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young man may never find out why he was denied employment because 
employers are not required to tell potential employees why they were 
denied a job.
5
  Finally, even if the young man is informed that it was due to 
his criminal conviction, this is of little consolation as he has already 
suffered by losing the job opportunity.  This is precisely the type of injury 
that expungements are designed to prevent.
6
  But, despite the court’s 
expungement of this young man’s record to prevent further lost 
opportunities, the young man must go through steps to remove the 
information from DataBrokerX’s archives.7  Once he has done this, there is 
still no guarantee that DataBrokerX is the only company with the 
information. 
It is a reasonable argument that a young man in this position deserves a 
second chance.  However, even barring debate about whether or not the 
young man deserved to have his conviction expunged, one can recognize 
that once the young man has been granted an expungement, he is entitled by 
law to the benefits of that expungement.  It is a fundamental principle of our 
legal system that the law must be upheld.  This Comment will argue that, 
once an expungement is granted, it is wrong for a non-governmental source 
to release information about the conviction, because that action undermines 
the purpose of expungement laws. 
Expungement is a special form of relief that allows individuals, like 
the young man in the hypothetical, to “restore him[self] to his former status 
in society”8 by essentially erasing his criminal history and granting him a 
clean slate.  This allows individuals with expunged records to legally 
 
5 One major problem with the issue proposed herein is that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine how often expunged records are released or how often the release 
of expunged records results in the loss of housing or an employment opportunity.  This is 
due, in part, to the fact that employers are not required to disclose why they pass over a 
particular person for a job and landlords do not have to disclose why they choose one tenant 
over another.  As such, there is currently no way of determining precisely how many people 
are affected by the wrongful dissemination of expunged records.  This Comment is 
somewhat limited due to that lack of empirical research to back up its claims; however, the 
fact that the structure of the data-broker industry allows for the release of expunged criminal 
records combined with reports of individual incidents where expunged records have been 
wrongfully released, provide enough of a basis for the arguments contained herein.  An 
interesting and important supplement to this Comment would be an empirical study 
quantifying the effect of the data-broker industry on post-expungement privacy.  See infra 
Part III for further discussion. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 Removing information from a data broker’s archive is often an arduous process that can 
even require a person to purchase his or her own records before requesting that the 
information be removed.  See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
8 People v. Mgebrov, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  Other state courts 
have described the purpose for providing expungement in similar terms.  See infra Part II. 
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refrain from disclosing information about their expunged conviction to 
potential employers or landlords.
9
  When the expungement is granted, an 
expungement order is served on a government recordkeeping agency; this 
order generally requires the destruction or prohibits the release of any 
records pertaining to the expunged arrest or conviction.
10
  However, 
because trials are public and criminal information is also a matter of public 
record, it is currently not illegal for non-government sources (e.g., data 
brokers) to obtain criminal records.
11
  Furthermore, expungement orders do 
not apply to non-government sources.
12
  This may be because when 
expungement laws were first passed, the government was the only source 
for obtaining criminal records,
13
 or perhaps because legislators did not 
predict the growth of the data-broker industry.  Either way, data brokers are 
currently free to distribute information from expunged records without any 
repercussions. 
Having identified a pertinent example of how technology has outpaced 
regulation, this Comment proposes that a massive and largely unregulated 
private data-broker industry poses a significant threat to post-expungement 
privacy at potentially great cost to individuals with expunged records.
14
  
Data brokers are not required to update their records, and as a result, 




Currently the onus of enforcing postconviction privacy rights is on 
individuals with expunged records.
16
  This Comment will propose that, 
because of the digitization of data sharing and the increased prevalence of 
the data-broker industry, individual enforcement is ineffective if not 
helpless to protect the rights of individuals with expunged records.  
Ultimately, this Comment will argue that if such violations of post-
 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See SEARCH, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD 
INFORMATION 82–83 (2005), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf. 
[hereinafter SEARCH REPORT]. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 83. 
13 See infra Part III.  
14 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live to Tell Tales, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1. 
15 Id.; see also Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal 
Background Tenant Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
181, 188–89 (2009). 
16 Oyama, supra note 15, at 189; see also SEARCH REPORT, infra note 76 (discussing 
the process for removing records from proprietary databases). 
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expungement privacy continue unregulated, they have the potential to 
render the legal remedy of expungement moot in the real world.
17
  
Therefore, because of the potential magnitude of this problem, an ex ante 
remedy in the form of federal legislation is the only way to protect post-
expungement privacy rights and expungement law itself.  As such, this 
Comment proposes goals for a federal statutory scheme.
18
 
This Comment will proceed in four major parts.  Part II discusses the 
underlying purpose for and importance of providing relief through 
expungement.
19
  Of particular importance is that expungement allows 
individuals to obtain employment and housing, unhampered by their status 
as ex-offenders.  Part III proceeds by discussing the evolution of the data-
broker industry and how criminal records have become readily available 
through largely unregulated, private, non-government sources.  Part III 
argues that the unregulated release of information by data brokers is posing 
a serious threat to the important role that expungement plays.  Part IV 
discusses why a federal regulatory scheme is the best way to protect post-
 
17 For a discussion on the importance of expungement as a legal remedy, see infra Part 
II. 
18 A major issue that often arises in the context of expungement is policy concerns about 
allowing ex-offenders to conduct themselves in society unidentified as having been 
convicted of a crime.  James W. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a 
Definition, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 73, 75–80 (1992).  Although such policy concerns do play 
a significant part in the overall scope of expungement scholarship and jurisprudence, they 
are beyond the scope of this Comment.  Because public safety concerns associated with the 
nondisclosure of an individual’s criminal record increase with the severity of the crime, this 
Comment applies only to those instances where expungement is arguably most 
uncontroversial: misdemeanor offenses and arrests that do not result in conviction.  The 
intention is to ameliorate policy concerns that account for the differences in expungement 
laws from state to state.  For this reason, juvenile and sex-related expungements are 
excluded.  Furthermore, even though a small percentage of states have passed laws that 
allow expungement of felony convictions, such statutes are excluded from this analysis 
because they tend to spark the most heated debate surrounding policy considerations.  E.g., 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-93-301 to -303 (2006) (permitting expungements for first-time 
felony convictions unless the crime involved a sex offense with a victim under the age of 
eighteen); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8506(c) (2007) (providing for expungement of felony 
convictions once the person reaches age eighty or reaches age seventy-five with no criminal 
activity listed on the person’s record in the preceding forty years); KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 21-6614 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (allowing expungement for 
certain felony convictions between three and ten years after completion of sentence, 
depending on the severity of crime).  That being said, the fact that a vast majority of states 
allow expungement of certain misdemeanor records is evidence that we as a society have 
embraced the idea that some people deserve a fresh start. 
19 There is currently no federal expungement statute.  For a discussion of the need for a 
federal expungement statute, see Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for 
Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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expungement privacy rights.  Finally, this Comment concludes with Part V, 
outlining the legislative aims in creating such a statute. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPUNGEMENT AS A LEGAL REMEDY 
Offering relief to individuals with expunged records after information 
from the expunged records has been released is about as effective as 
offering an umbrella after the rain.  This is because once a data broker 
releases the criminal record, the purpose of expungement is significantly 
undermined.  Before delving into violations of post-expungement privacy, 
this Comment will explore the rights expungement bestows upon a person 
and the source of those rights are derived.  This Part begins with a brief 
history and overview of expungement, then focuses on the importance of 
expungement as a form of legal relief and the purpose that it serves in 
society, and concludes with a discussion about the right to post-
expungement privacy and how the protection of information pertaining to 
expunged convictions is vital to the survival of expungement as a legal 
remedy. 
A. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
As of 2008, forty-five states and the District of Columbia have some 
form of expungement legislation.
20
  While the remedy has been given many 
different names—“sealing,”21 “erasure,”22 “deferred judgment,”23 “setting 
aside,”24 “vacated”25—the general aim behind each individual state law is 
remarkably similar across jurisdictions.  The goal is to eliminate at least 
some of the collateral consequences associated with criminal convictions 
and to facilitate reintegration into society for certain individuals by 
essentially granting them a clean slate.
26
 
Expungement is not granted lightly.
27
  Especially in the circumstances 
 
20 Mouzon, supra note 19, at 31 (“Most states have addressed the expungement issue 
through legislation.  Forty-five states, plus the District of Columbia, provide relief for some 
ex-offenders from the bondages attached to having a criminal history, either through 
expungement or other similar relief.”) (footnotes omitted). 
21 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180 (2006). 
22 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
23 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011). 
24 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.621 (West 2007). 
25 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.640, 9.95.240 (West 2009). 
26 See infra Part II.B. 
27 Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal 
Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1335 
(2005) (“Expungement is defined at law as an ‘extraordinary form of relief.’  It does not 
apply to every individual suffering the detrimental effects of a criminal history . . . .  [T]he 
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to which this Comment is limited, expungement is granted only to those 
who deserve it most.
28
  In sum, this Comment focuses only on misdemeanor 
convictions and reports of arrests that do not result in conviction—those 
instances of expungement where it can be assumed that the benefits gained 




B. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPUNGEMENT 
The most basic explanation for expungement is that we, as a society, 
recognize that some people deserve a second chance.
30
  Or, at the very least, 
our society has recognized that certain offenders do not deserve ‘criminal’ 
status once they have paid their debts to society.
31
  As such, the 
fundamental goal of expungement is to provide relief from the stigma 
associated with criminal status.
32
  Our society makes a litany of 
 
remedy is unique and given only to the most deserving individuals.” (footnote omitted)). 
28 See infra Part II.B. 
29 For support of society’s interest in granting expungement, see Geffen & Letze, supra 
note 27, at 1340 (“Expungement relieves society of the burden of supporting certain 
individuals with criminal records.  As previously explained, an expungement can allow an 
individual to obtain employment and eliminate the individual’s reliance on government 
benefits.”). 
30 See, e.g., State v. N.W., 747 A.2d 819, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (finding 
the New Jersey legislature’s purpose in enacting an expungement statute was to “give a one-
time offender who has changed his or her life a second chance”); Steven K. O’Hern, 
Expungement: Lies That Can Hurt You In and Out of Court, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 574 
(“Expungement of a prior criminal conviction is often viewed as an admirable process, 
allowing an ex-offender a fresh start.” (footnotes omitted)). 
31 Luz A. Carrion, Rethinking Expungement of Juvenile Records in Massachusetts: The 
Case of Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 331, 368 (referring to both adult 
and juvenile expungement and stating that “[r]ecord expungement serves the crucial societal 
function of giving a second chance to the average person who needs a clean record to 
advance and succeed in life and who will be most harmed by a record’s existence” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
32 Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157 (1999) (addressing 
the effect of collateral consequences and stating that “deprivation of the benefits of 
citizenship carries a strong symbolic message stigmatizing convicted felons as less than full 
members of society”); Andrew Hacker, Comment, The Use of Expunged Records to Impeach 
Credibility in Arizona, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 470 (2010) (“The ‘collateral consequences’ of a 
criminal record often carry other, more subtle burdens that are not easily quantified.  The 
social stigma associated with a criminal past—sometimes referred to as ‘the stigma of 
conviction’—often is unaffected even after a rehabilitated offender has had his civil rights 
restored.  The simple fact that an offender carries a record serves to ‘emphasize [the 
offender’s] “other-ness”’ within society.” (citing Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with 
a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1705, 1716 (2003))). 
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assumptions about a person upon learning that they have a criminal record: 
it is assumed that they are somehow less credible
33
 and less trustworthy.
34
  




The conundrum herein is further complicated when knowledge of a 
criminal conviction is obtained through the use of data brokers.  First and 
foremost, data brokers maintain proprietary databases and most are not 
required to update their records.
36
  This Comment proposes that because of 
this lack of regulation in updating their records, expunged convictions are 
stored and released from these proprietary databases as if they had never 
been expunged.
37
  Another problem with information from data brokers is 
that, in creating consumer reports, data brokers often omit information and 
reword or misinterpret language from the original court documents.
38
  The 
resulting report might therefore contain a record of an arrest but no record 
of the disposition—a serious problem if the charges were subsequently 
dropped, for example.
39
  Or a report might mention the same offense twice, 




The problem arises because assumptions are made about a person with 
 
33 Even our judicial system allows for the introduction of a person’s prior criminal 
conviction “[f]or the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness” of that witness.  
FED. R. EVID. 609. 
34 Mouzon, supra note 19, at 2 (“The mere existence of a criminal history can produce 
assumptions of past dishonesty and future untrustworthiness in the minds of all those aware 
of that history.” (footnote omitted)).  Cf. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: 
Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1056 (2003) (stating 
that information about a person’s criminal past is highly relevant to determining a person’s 
trustworthiness). 
35 Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1332 (“A publicly available criminal record is 
devastating to an individual’s hope of re-integrating into society, especially with respect to 
employment and housing.”). 
36 See infra Part III. 
37 However, there is a lack of empirical data to support this proposition, so this Comment 
also advocates the need for an empirical study.  See supra text accompanying note 5. 
38 For a thorough discussion of the potential problems with electronic databases, see 
Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned 
Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–96 (2007); see also SEARCH REPORT, supra 
note 10, at 11 (describing the process by which data brokers catalogue information in their 
databases by converting information from many different sources into one standard format 
that varies from data broker to data broker); see also Oyama, supra note 15, at 188–90 
(noting that commercial criminal records databases are often “rife with error,” resulting in 
inaccurate reports, and that reports can be difficult for lay users to interpret correctly). 
39 Oyama, supra note 15, at 188–90. 
40 Id. 
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a criminal record, and once those assumptions are made they cannot be 
undone.  In other words, the social stigmatization of the criminal status is so 
severe that subsequently learning a conviction was expunged usually does 
nothing to change the opinions of those people who had previously found 
out about the crime.
41
  This means that as soon as employers or landlords 
discover that a person has a criminal record, the damage is likely 
irreparable. 
Social stigmatization as a result of having a criminal record is a root 
cause for some of the collateral consequences associated with the 
commission of a crime.  In that way, expungement can be thought of as a 
vehicle for alleviating at least some of those consequences.
42
  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “collateral consequences” as “[a] penalty for committing 
a crime, in addition to the penalties included in the criminal sentence.”43  
Employers and landlords frequently rely on criminal background checks to 
vet applicants and often have policies in place that automatically disqualify 
an applicant based on his or her status as a convicted criminal.
44
  Loss of 
employment or housing is likely the most common, and arguably most 
detrimental, collateral consequence ex-offenders face.
45
  For this reason, the 
freedom from disclosing the existence of a criminal record, even when 
asked directly on an application, is traditionally thought to be a benefit of 
expungement.  Take, for example, California’s expungement law, which 
states: 
In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire 
period of probation, or . . . in any other case in which a court, in its discretion and the 
interests of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted the relief available 
under this section . . . the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information 
against the defendant and except as noted below, he or she shall thereafter be released 
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has 
been convicted . . . .
46
 
The phrase “released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from 
 
41 Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1332. 
42 For a discussion of the expansive collateral consequences associated with criminal 
convictions, see Demleitner, supra note 32, passim. 
43 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (9th ed. 2009). 
44 Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1340 (explaining that employers and landlords view 
criminal records as somehow being indicative of a tendency in the individual to be unreliable 
or dishonest and that such a presumption provides valid grounds for denying employment or 
housing in many if not most jurisdictions). 
45 Demleitner, supra note 32, at 156–57 (discussing the effects of ex-offender status on 
access to employment); Oyama, supra note 15, at 181 (describing the devastating effect of 
housing discrimination against those individuals with criminal records). 
46 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (emphasis added). 
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the offense” 47 is said to provide the source for this right of nondisclosure in 
California and has been interpreted by the California Court of Appeals to 
mean that persons granted relief under this statute are released from “the 
obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question 
contained in any questionnaire or application.”48 
But wouldn’t it also follow that in order for an expungement to be 
effective, information pertaining to the original conviction must be 
similarly unavailable through means other than disclosure by the ex-
offender?  As described below in Part III of this Comment, prior to the 
digitization of information, simply granting this freedom not to disclose—
and serving the expungement order on the local or state agency maintaining 
records—was all that was needed to prevent the information from being 
unlawfully disclosed.  However, in an internet era, simply granting 
individuals the freedom not to disclose the existence of their criminal record 
is no longer effective at preventing that information from being disclosed. 
Expungement is a unique form of relief.  It grants certain ex-offenders 
a “clean slate,” essentially erasing the existence of a past offense.49  In fact, 
in 1943, the Southern District of California, shortly after the passage of 
California’s first expungement legislation, went so far as to equate 
expungement with the grant of a pardon, stating that: 
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the 
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of 
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had 
never committed the offence.  If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the 
penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after 
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil 




If the intended result of an expungement is to render the offender “as 
innocent as if he had never committed the offence,” then, carrying the 
reasoning of this court to its logical end, it is absolutely imperative that the 
existence of the offense itself be kept a secret after expungement.
51
  In sum, 
expungement serves an important societal function in eliminating some of 
 
47 Id. 
48 People v. Mendez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
49 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “expungement of record” as follows: “The removal of 
a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal record.—Also termed 
expunction of record; erasure of record.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009). 
50 In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975, 977 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (quoting Ex parte Garland, 4 
Wall. 333, 380–81 (1866)). 
51 Diehm, supra note 18, at 76 (“The expungement of a criminal record will be of little 
value if anyone acknowledges the record’s existence.”). 
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the collateral consequences associated with conviction and allowing 
individuals to reintegrate into society by obtaining employment and 
housing.  Therefore, in order for expungements to continue to provide relief 
in an internet era, there must be a mechanism in place to ensure that post-
expungement privacy violations do not occur. 
III. THE DATA-BROKER INDUSTRY 
The right to access public records, including court documents, is long 
established in the United States.
52
  Accordingly, employers and landlords 
have long been able to obtain the criminal records of potential employees 
and tenants.  However, it was not until after the advent of the internet in the 
early 1990s that America experienced an explosion of the data-broker 
industry.
53
  Prior to that time, obtaining information from public records 
was very much a localized operation.
54
  Generally, the person, company, or 
investigative agency for hire seeking information would obtain records on a 
case-by-case basis directly from whatever state or local agency maintained 
such records.
55
  Essentially, prior to the invention of the internet and the 
creation of the private data-broker industry, the primary—if not singular—
way of obtaining information about an individual’s criminal record for the 
purpose of employment or housing was by obtaining information directly 
from a state agency.
56
 
Now, however, we live in a different era.  Consumer reports that 
contain criminal history are now widely available through the use of third-
party private background check companies and oftentimes directly over the 
 
52 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
53 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 29.  According to a report from the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, many scholars have also speculated that an increased demand for employee 
and tenant background checks after the events of September 11th has contributed to large 
industry growth.  See id. at 31; James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, 
and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 204–05 (2007) 
(noting an increase in fingerprinting and background checks post-September 11th); Liptak, 
supra note 14 (“Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, criminal background checks have 
become routine in many employment applications.”); Oyama, supra note 15, at 187 (“Post-
9/11 screening requirements have contributed to an ‘explosion’ in the demand for criminal 
background checks in employment and tenant placement.”). 
54 David S. Ardia, Reputations in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations 
of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 310 (2010). 
55 Id.  It’s also worth noting that such records were usually maintained on paper and that 
obtaining a “copy” of records at that time meant that the person would receive a paper 
photocopy rather than digitized records, which are available now in many if not most 
jurisdictions. 
56 Id. 




  The process by which records are obtained and what types of 
records are available varies somewhat based on individual state laws.
58
  
However, modern data brokers, rather than obtaining information on a case-
by-case basis, now purchase information in bulk from state and local 
sources and store that information in their own databases.
59
  Over time these 
databases have grown substantially and the data contained therein often 
spans multiple jurisdictions and dates back many years.
60
 
This Part will address two major issues that have contributed to the 
evolution of the modern data-broker industry.  First, the demand for 
information at your fingertips has created strong industry incentives for data 
brokers to acquire massive databases and to grow them constantly, rather 
than update or eliminate old records.  With the digitization of data and 
certain state and local practices making the accumulation of data more 
streamlined, these companies now have massive databases with information 
about private citizens.  The second issue is that without regulation requiring 
these companies to update their records or punishing them for distributing 
false data, there are no disincentives to balance out the perverse incentives 
provided by the consumers.  The result is a wildly unregulated behemoth of 




A. THE DATABASES: HOW INFORMATION IS COLLECTED, STORED, 
AND DUPLICATED 
The general process by which the biggest data brokers obtain records 
is through what has been termed “bulk data purchases.”62  This entails the 
bulk purchase of criminal records for multiple individuals all at one time 
from state or local recordkeeping agencies and then storing that information 
in proprietary databases “for instant searches.”63  Early in the development 
of the data-broker industry, local agencies recognized the moneymaking 
potential in selling public records to data brokers, and many of those local 
 
57 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–9 (listing the key players in the data-broker 
industry); BEST BACKGROUND CHECKS, http://www.bestbackgroundchecks.com (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2011) (providing a directory of recommended data brokers in each state). 
58 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 39–43; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1786–1786.2 
(West 2009) (governing the process for obtaining and distributing public records in 
California). 
59 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–8, 10; Liptak, supra note 14. 
60 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–8. 
61 See infra Part III.B. 
62 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, 10–12. 
63 Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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agencies now garner a considerable profit from the practice.
64
  
Notwithstanding limitations through some individual states’ laws and 
practices,
65
 local agencies are essentially free to give over public records to 
data brokers and turn a profit in the process.
66
 
Furthermore, when the data-broker industry first blossomed, such 
databases were usually limited to one jurisdiction or at least single states; 
but over time data brokers began advertising national databases that would 
“allow users to almost instantly search proprietary databases containing 
upwards of 160 million criminal records from every State.”67  For example, 
one data broker’s homepage boasts that “[w]ith one click [you can] search 
over 300 million criminal records drawn from the archives of US courts and 
correctional facilities.”68 
Essentially, once a large market emerged for private background 
checks,
69
 those companies providing the most information the fastest gained 
a competitive advantage.  In order to meet demand, these companies were 
incentivized to grow their own databases by accumulating records in bulk 
from state and local agencies rather than engaging in the time-consuming 




64 Oyama, supra note 15, 189 n.41 (“Some state and local governmental agencies have 
discovered the profitability in offering [to sell criminal records] at a price.  For example, the 
Indianapolis Police Department makes criminal histories available at $15 per search on their 
website, http://www.civicnet.net/allservices.html; the South Carolina Law Enforcement 
Division charges $25 per name to perform a statewide criminal check on a name, 
http://www.sled.sc.gov/CATCHHome.aspx?MenuID=CATCH.”). 
65 Some states have passed laws that limit or prohibit the sale of certain records—
including criminal records—but these restrictions have actually had little effect on the data-
broker industry as a whole.  For an explanation and overview of these state regulations, see 
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 39–43.  Some state agents simply refuse to engage in 
the practice of selling records precisely because of the potential for subsequent violations of 
post-expungement privacy.  Liptak, supra note 14 (quoting a district clerk in Texas on the 
subject: “How the hell do I expunge anything . . . if I sell tapes and disks all over the 
country?”). 
66 See SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 39–43 (providing an overview of state 
statutes that regulate the sale and use of criminal records, but noting that very few are 
tailored to regulate data brokers). 
67 Id. at 11. 
68 Criminal Records, INFOREGISTRY, http://www.inforegistry.com/index.php?page=
criminal_records (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
69 After the events of September 11, 2001, there was a sudden and significant rise in the 
demand for criminal background checks and consumer reporting services.  See supra note 
53.  
70 The growth of national databases began around 2001, suggesting that the demand for 
criminal records after September 11th created this industry incentive.  See SEARCH 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 11 (stating that data brokers began accumulating nationwide 
databases in 2001); Oyama, supra note 15, at 187 (attributing the growth of the data-broker 
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Naturally, these companies have to provide accurate information or 
they would lose credibility with their customers.  However, disclosing 
information from expunged records would not necessarily diminish their 
credibility, especially when considering data brokers’ clientele.  One can 
imagine that an employer or landlord who receives information from an 
expunged record might not be dissatisfied with the background check 
company at all; rather, the consumer would likely be pleased.  Firstly, it is 
important to note that information about an expunged conviction is not 
factually incorrect.
71
  The individual was found guilty of a crime in the past 
and granting an expungement does not make that fact any less true.  
Furthermore, it is highly likely that employers and landlords would be 
pleased to know that a potential employee or tenant once had a record, even 
if he or she did not anymore. 
As discussed in Part II of this Comment, the stigma of a criminal 
record is incredibly strong.  The suggestion being that the stigma associated 
with criminal status is so strong and so negative that landlords and 
employers will often deny housing and employment to individuals with 
criminal records based only on the fact of their having a record.
72
  It is for 
this reason that data brokers face no industry pressure to avoid releasing 
information from expunged records.  In fact, it is possible that because 
employers and landlords might respond positively to the disclosure of 
expunged records, data brokers actually have an incentive not to update 
records or perform due diligence before releasing information.
73
  If state 
and local recordkeeping agencies no longer have that information, data 
brokers then become the only source from which employers and landlords 
could obtain information from expunged records—information that the data 
brokers’ clientele would likely value. 
The fact remains that the story of our hypothetical young man is not 
hyperbole.
74
  Where criminal records were once contained in file cabinets at 
 
industry to increased demand for criminal records after September 11th). 
71 For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A. 
72 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
73 While there is no hard data to back up the argument that employers and landlords 
would appreciate the disclosure of expunged records, it is certainly not an unwarranted 
assumption based on the information cited in Part II of this Comment.  Again, this is an area 
where empirical research is important to supplement efforts to reform the data-broker 
industry. 
74 Even though extensive data quantifying the issue is unavailable, there is evidence that 
background checks containing expunged records have had adverse consequences for 
individuals in the job and housing market.  See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 14 (discussing 
several cases where people were denied employment and housing based on the disclosure of 
their expunged records by background check companies).  One man was denied employment 
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local courthouses and halls of records, they are now mobile, capable of 
rapid duplication, and readily accessible in electronic form.
75
  They are 
being stored in massive, privately maintained databases and they are rarely, 
if ever, updated.
76
  Finally, the combination of the industry’s incentive not 
to update and increased access to information through the growth of the 
industry creates an alarming likelihood that incorrect or harmful 
information will come to light.
77
  Although it is unclear how frequently 
outdated or expunged records are released, industry practice suggests it is 
likely happening with alarming frequency.
78
 
B. AN UNREGULATED INDUSTRY 
Not only is there an industry incentive not to update records, but there 
is also no counterweight to that incentive.  As it stands, data brokers are not 
required to exercise any due diligence with respect to the release of 
 
based on the disclosure of his expunged record and is now suing both his potential employer 
and the data broker that provided the information.  An unidentified woman was unable to 
purchase a condominium because her expunged conviction appeared on a background check.  
And a third, unidentified man was unable to procure employment for six months due to an 
expunged conviction appearing on his background check.  Id. 
75 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing the increasing digitization of court 
records); Oyama, supra note 15, at 187 (“By 2003, 94% of the criminal history records 
maintained by the state criminal history repositories were automated (71 million records).”). 
76 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 11–12 (“Updates are typically available on a 
monthly basis.  This varies, however, depending not only upon how often the sources make 
updates available, but also on whether the vendor promptly obtains the update and integrates 
it into existing products.  Updates may include only new records or they may also include 
updated or deleted records.  As a result, vendors customarily prefer to obtain an entirely new 
copy of the database because this relieves the vendor of having to merge a small subset of 
updates into an existing system . . . .  [T]he commercial vendor must be proactive, 
submitting orders and payments to the court or agency, which subsequently sends the data.”).  
As noted above, there is no incentive for vendors to incur the extra cost or exert the extra 
effort in obtaining updates in this way. 
77 Once again, no empirical studies have been conducted to determine the number of 
people who have been, or might be, adversely affected by the release of expunged records.  
This is possibly due to the fact that employers and landlords do not always disclose their 
reasons for denying employment and housing.  See Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 53, at 212 
(“Employers may actually disqualify job applicants based on a criminal record, but offer 
other reasons or no reason at all for having rejected the ex-offender in favor of another job 
applicant.”).  Or perhaps it would be very difficult to determine how many criminal records 
that have since been expunged are still being stored in private databases.  Ultimately, such a 
study would be an interesting, if not vital, follow-up to this argument. 
78 As this Section argues, the industry provides disincentives for data brokers to be 
proactive in seeking out updated records, and Part III.B of this Comment discusses the lack 
of regulation that would compel them to do the same.  The resulting combination of factors 
strongly supports an inference that expunged records are stored in private databases and 
released without consequence. 




  This Section addresses the current process for 
removing information from propriety databases and how that process—
individual enforcement—is inadequate to protect post-expungement 
privacy.  Next, this Section discusses the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), which is the only federal statute even tangentially related to data 
brokers.  However, this Section will show that the FCRA’s provisions were 
not designed to regulate data brokers, making it an inefficient vehicle for 
protecting post-expungement privacy.  Finally, this Section concludes by 
proposing a need for an independent statutory system specifically designed 
to regulate the data-broker industry. 
Currently, the only way to remove an expunged conviction from a data 
broker’s records is to personally request that the information be removed.  
This process is arduous and involves the submission of several documents 
including court dispositions and expungement orders.
80
  In fact, some data 
brokers even require that one submit along with this request a copy of the 
information as it appears on the report from their websites.
81
  This 
requirement is particularly troubling because it forces individuals to 
purchase their own consumer reports before finding out whether any one 
database contains an expunged conviction. 
Even with a system that would easily allow an individual to remove 
 
79 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 11–12 (discussing the lack of regulation requiring 
data brokers to update their records and noting that updates are scarcely available for even 
those data brokers that might want to update their records). 
80 See, e.g., Email from Lucy, Customer Serv. Representative, InfoRegistry.com, to 
[name redacted] (Nov. 22, 2010) (on file with author) (responding to an inquiry into the 
process for removing information from expunged records).  This email responded as follows: 
The best way to ensure that your information is removed properly is to contact us.  As a courtesy, 
you may opt-out of having certain of your information included in the Data that appears in search 
results if one of these conditions exist: (1) You are a state, local or federal law enforcement 
officer or public official and your position exposes you to a threat of death or serious bodily 
harm; or (2) you are a victim of identity theft; or (3) you are at risk of physical harm; or (4) you 
have evidence the record is incorrect or expunged.  To opt-out, submit the following information: 
1) A written explanation for the opt out request.  Identify the specific location of Your Data on 
our Website, and where your personal Data is publicly available, identify one of the four 
conditions You [sic] enabling you to opt-out of having your personal Data removed, and describe 
why such personal Data that is publicly available is inaccurate and harmful.  NOTE: Please 
submit ONE request per individual.  2) Copy of your current driver’s license or state 
identification (this information is necessary in order for us to authenticate that the request is 
being made by the individual to whom the information belongs to).  All requests must include: 
[f]ull name and date of birth, [a]liases, if any, [c]urrent address, [p]revious addresses, [p]hone, 
[e]mail address.  3) Specific complete details of the records you are requesting to be removed.  
NOTE: Only your current and up to two previous address records will be removed.  4) Include a 
print out of the records you wish to have suppressed.  5) Copies of any applicable court orders, if 
any. 
81 Id. 
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his or her own information, individual enforcement is still ineffective at 
fixing the problem for more than just that one individual.
82
  As discussed 
above, by the time that most individuals are made aware of the information 
in these databases,
83
 the information has likely already been released and 
the individuals have already suffered the negative consequences. 
The only mechanism that currently regulates the activities of credit and 
background check companies is the FCRA.
84
  However, there are several 
issues that prevent the FCRA from being a successful tool in addressing the 
specific issues associated with data brokers and post-expungement privacy.  
Primarily, the FCRA does not impose any affirmative duties on data 
brokers to update their records, and its enforcement provisions still put the 
onus of ensuring compliance on individual persons.  In sum, the FCRA is 
impotent to address the problem at issue and may even help to contribute to 
post-expungement privacy violations rather than curb them.
85
 
When the FCRA was drafted in 1970, the internet as we have come to 
know it had not yet been invented
86
 and any consumer information or public 
records were still largely kept on paper.  The result was a piece of 
legislation that failed to comprehend the ease with which information 
would one day be collected and widely disseminated.
87
  After all, how could 
the members of Congress in 1970 anticipate the information age?   
However, even with its current amendments, the FCRA still does not 
 
82 Furthermore, even if a person succeeds at removing the information from one broker’s 
proprietary database, the person would likely have to repeat the process for every other 
broker that could potentially have purchased his records.  Oftentimes, multiple data-broker 
companies maintain separate databases.  Thus, each individual with an expunged record 
would have to contact each data broker and go through its arduous process to request that the 
information be removed. 
83 That is, if they are ever even made aware.  See supra notes 43–44, 77 and 
accompanying text. 
84 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2010).  The FCRA applies, in 
part, to any “consumer reporting agency that regularly engages in the practice of assembling 
or evaluating, and maintaining, for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third 
parties bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, . . . 
[p]ublic record information.”  Id. § 1681a(p). 
85 For an enlightening discussion of the FCRA and its flaws, see De Armond, supra note 
38, at 1098–1118.   
86 See generally The Internet: A Short History of Getting Connected, FED. COMM. 
COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history/internet/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
87 It also bears mentioning that many state expungement statutes were also drafted prior 
to the information era and so likely also failed to anticipate the digitization of data.  See, e.g., 
Act of July 15, 1935, ch. 604, § 5, 1935 Cal. Stats. 1709–10 (codified as amended at CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011)); Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137, 
§ 23, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 531 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.94A.640 (West 2010)); see generally Liptak, supra note 14. 
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necessarily apply to all private data brokers selling criminal records to 
private citizens.
88
  The FCRA was created with the aim of ensuring that 
“consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the 
needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other 
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with 
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of 
such information.”89  In 1998, the Federal Trade Commission issued an 
advisory letter confirming certain sections of the FCRA applied to agencies 
that provide criminal records information for employment purposes.
90
  But 
many data brokers still escape regulation and liability under the statute.
91
  
This is likely because the general spirit of the FCRA—especially evident in 
its citizen-suit provision
92—is to protect consumers with respect to financial 
and other consumer credit data, not with respect to criminal records.
93
  One 
such provision that evinces the legislature’s intent to move away from 
 
88  The FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency and what activities are covered under 
its provisions.  See supra note 95.  However, these provisions are written is such a way that 
data brokers are able to define themselves out of the FCRA’s grasp.  See, e.g., Email from 
Lucy, supra note 80 (“Please be aware that we are not a ‘consumer reporting agency’ as 
defined by the FCRA, as we do not provide any data for use in credit, insurance, or 
employment screening.  We explicitly prohibit the use of our service and the data it supplies 
for such purposes.”). 
89 FCRA § 1681(b). 
90 Advisory Letter from William Haynes, Division of Credit Practices, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, to Richard LeBlanc, Due Diligence, Inc. (June 9, 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/leblanc.shtm (regarding Sections 603, 607, and 609 of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
91 See supra note 88. 
92 It is worth noting that as of July 26, 2011, certain sections of the citizen-suit provision 
of the FCRA were rescinded.  Statement of General Policy or Interpretation; Commentary on 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 44462-01 (July 26, 2011) (rescinding 16 C.F.R. 
§§ 600.1–.2).  However, because these changes are so recent, it is unclear what their effect 
will be on future litigation against data brokers under the FCRA.  These changes may reflect 
an effort to bring data brokers under the fold of the FCRA, but it is also possible that they 
will push data brokers further out of the FCRA’s grasp as some past amendments have done.  
See infra note 93.  Regardless of the potential effect of these changes to the FCRA, the 
purpose of this Section is to illustrate how the FCRA has not yet been successful at 
regulating data brokers.  Therefore, this Section includes cases and articles analyzing the 
FCRA prior to the recent rescission. 
93 The 2003 amendments removed a provision prohibiting the release of criminal 
convictions dating back more than seven years, thus allowing credit reporting agencies to 
hold on to criminal records indefinitely.  Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
(FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003); see also Geffen & Letze, supra note 
27, at 1339.  While it is possible that this provision was removed in order to preserve the 
statute’s purpose as being confined to consumer-credit agencies, it is certainly true that by 
removing protections on criminal records, the FCRA became less effective at regulating the 
data-broker industry. 
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regulating data brokers is the fact that the FCRA allows criminal 
convictions to be reported indefinitely.
94
  This provision encourages the 
disclosure of expunged records rather than serving to regulate the practice. 
Furthermore, even if the FCRA applied to all data brokers, the only 
restriction that it would place on them is the requirement that they “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy.”95  This 
vague and ambiguous standard hardly imposes an affirmative duty upon 
data brokers to update their records.  In fact, courts have interpreted this 
accuracy provision as requiring data brokers only to “weigh the potential 
that the information will create a misleading impression against the 
availability of more accurate [or complete] information and the burden of 
providing such information.”96  Essentially, the FCRA allows data brokers 
to pass on unvetted information without suffering any consequences, even if 
the information turns out to be incorrect.
97
 
This leads to the second reason why the FCRA does not adequately 
regulate problems specifically associated with post-expungement privacy.  
Not only does the FCRA fail at imposing affirmative duties on data brokers, 
its enforcement provisions are both textually and practically insufficient to 
provide consumers with a remedy after their post-expungement rights have 
been violated.
98
  The FCRA contains a citizen-suit provision that allows 
civil causes of action for both willful and negligent noncompliance with the 
FCRA provisions.
99
  However, as discussed above, courts have interpreted 
the responsibilities of data brokers under the FCRA’s accuracy provisions 
to be so minimal that plaintiffs rarely prevail in such suits.
100
  The result is a 
statutory scheme that fails to regulate the release of harmful, false 
information and then fails to provide an adequate remedy for those who are 
directly harmed when the information is released. 
 
94 See Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1339. 
95 FCRA § 1681e(b); see also Haynes, supra note 90. 
96 See, e.g., Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1984). 
97 De Armond, supra note 85, at 1102–03; see, e.g., Smith v. Auto Mashers, Inc., 85 F. 
Supp. 2d 638, 641 (W.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing a complaint against a data broker on the 
grounds that “simply by reporting an item of information that turns out to be inaccurate” is 
not a violation of the FCRA). 
98 Notwithstanding the fact that ex post remedies fail to prevent or remedy harms 
associated with post-expungement privacy, this Section will discuss the inadequacies of the 
FCRA in providing any sort of remedy for those individuals whose post-expungement rights 
have been violated.  See infra Parts IV–V for a discussion dismissing ex post remedies in the 
post-expungement privacy context. 
99 FCRA § 1681n (imposing civil liability for willful noncompliance), id. § 1681o (civil 
liability for negligent noncompliance). 
100 De Armond, supra note 38, at 1103–04. 
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The FCRA is the only statute that currently governs the data-broker 
industry, and it is woefully inadequate to address the issues of post-
expungement privacy.  Therefore, a comprehensive legislative mechanism 
specifically designed to regulate the data-broker industry is needed to 
protect post-expungement privacy rights. 
IV. SUPPORT FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE 
This Part will argue that a federal statute is the only remedy likely to 
have a significant effect on the violation of post-expungement privacy 
rights.  This Part first explores and dismisses individual, private common 
law causes of action as one possible remedy.
101
  Next, this Part addresses 
the possibility of state regulation, but ultimately dismisses this as 
ineffective due to the national reach of the data-broker industry.  Finally, 
this Part discusses the authority under which a federal statute can be 
devised and will make arguments for such a statute’s comparative 
superiority to the other two remedies aforementioned. 
A. WHY PRIVATE CIVIL CAUSES OF ACTION ARE INADEQUATE 
An individual private right of action is one possible way to enforce 
post-expungement privacy laws.  One type of private civil action—action 
under the FCRA—has already been discussed and dismissed as an 
inadequate remedy in Part III of this Comment.  However, there are other 
civil actions that would provide possible methods for enforcing post-
expungement privacy rights.  This Comment ultimately argues that such 
individual remedies without the support of a larger government regulatory 
scheme would be inadequate to address the scope of this issue.  The 
overarching and most salient reason is that there is essentially no way to 
provide any ex post remedy when post-expungement privacy rights have 
been violated; no one can un-ring the bell.  However, there are also 
problems with individual civil remedies—such as the tort of defamation—
in that those traditional causes of action would not support claims for 
violations of post-expungement privacy even if such claims would be 
valuable to potential plaintiffs. 
In January 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided G.D. v. 
Kenny.
102
  This case involves a defamation
103
 suit based on the disclosure of 
 
101 This Comment uses the example of defamation suits in representing all private 
common law causes of action. 
102 15 A.3d 300 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
103 In New Jersey, defamation is a tort that is defined as follows: “In order to prove 
defamation, a plaintiff must establish, in addition to damages, that the defendant (1) made a 
defamatory statement of fact (2) concerning the plaintiff (3) which was false, and (4) which 
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information from expunged criminal records.  The facts of the G.D. case 
were as follows: the plaintiff, a former aide to a political candidate in New 
Jersey, brought a defamation claim against members of an opposing 
candidate’s staff who had circulated political smear fliers referring to the 
plaintiff’s drug-related convictions, which had previously been expunged.104  
The plaintiff claimed that the fliers constituted defamation (as well as 
several other torts) and the defendant claimed truth as a defense.
105
  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately decided for the defendant on three 
separate grounds: first, that the defendants were entitled to a truth 
defense;
106
 second, that the fliers were substantially true;
107
 and third, that 
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy just because 
his convictions were expunged.
108
 
This case is particularly pertinent for several reasons.  The court’s 
three holdings highlight two different problems with defamation suits for 
post-expungement privacy violations.  First, the problem of truth:
109
 in 
allowing defamation suits for the disclosure of expunged convictions, 
courts would be creating a legal fiction whereby the fact of a conviction 
somehow becomes “untrue” once it has been expunged.  One could argue—
as G.D. did
110—that the statements have a defamatory nature because the 
 
was communicated to a person or persons other than the plaintiff.”  Feggans v. Billington, 
677 A.2d 771, 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (citing Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 520 
A.2d 1154 (N.J. App. Div. 1987)). 
104 G.D., 15 A.3d at 306.  The flier, including a picture of the plaintiff, read: 
TEAM STACK:  COKE DEALERS.  GUN RUNNERS.  EX-CONS[.]  THE MORE PEOPLE KNOW, THE 
MORE QUESTIONS THEY HAVE ABOUT BRIAN STACK.  UNION CITY MAYOR BRIAN STACK’S 
CLOSEST POLITICAL OPERATIVES: GUN RUNNERS, COKE DEALERS, EX-CONS.  We all know 
the threat that drugs and illegal guns have in our communities.  But not Brian Stack.  
He continues to surround himself with one shady character after another—not one but 
two convicted drug dealers and ex-cons, whom Stack got a high paying county job 
and a drugged out gun running lowlife who was his campaign manager.  BRIAN STACK 
PREACHES “REFORM” AND “GOOD GOVERNMENT” BUT HIS ADMINISTRATION IS MADE UP 
OF SLEAZY DRUG DEALERS AND OTHERS WHO SHOULD BE NOWHERE NEAR THE PUBLIC 
TREASURY. 
Id. (line breaks omitted). 
105 Id. at 304. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. (“Although our expungement statute relieves a prior offender of some civil 
disabilities, it does not extinguish the truth.”). 
108 Id. 
109 This problem encompasses the court’s first two holdings that the defendants are 
entitled to a truth defense and that the fliers were substantially true. 
110 G.D., 15 A.3d at 307–09. 
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expungement itself renders them essentially untrue.
111
  However, the fact 
remains that the conviction did occur and just because it was expunged does 
not make it untrue.
112
  As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, truth is not 
just a common law defense to defamation but it is also protected by the 
First Amendment.
113
  From the perspective of a defendant in a defamation 
suit for post-expungement privacy violations, a finding of liability would 
erode those First Amendment rights.  And for what?  The most any plaintiff 
can hope for is monetary damages because the harm caused by the release 
of information cannot be undone. 
To further prove the point, consider a situation where the alleged 
defamer also discloses that the record was expunged.  This statement would 
still harm the defendant in the same way—because it discloses the existence 
of their criminal record—but, in this instance, it is a completely true 
statement because the defamer also discloses that the record was expunged.  
The fact remains that the release of expunged records can cause the same 
type of harm that ordinary defamatory statements can.  However, the fact of 
expungement does not render those statements untrue, and thus post-




The final part of the G.D. court’s holding, that G.D. did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, highlights another complication with 
civil suits as a remedy for post-expungement privacy violations—the fact 
that convictions are made public.  The New Jersey Supreme Court noted 
that arrests, indictments, and convictions are a matter of public record,
115
 
and as a result newspapers, magazines, court reporters, individuals, and 
 
111 As discussed in Part II of this Comment, expungements grant citizens the right to 
proceed as if they were never convicted of a crime and to be free of the “criminal” 
designation.  Following that logic, one could argue that disclosing the fact of an expunged 
criminal conviction is untrue because that person is no longer a “criminal.”  This is the spirit 
of what G.D. attempts to argue.  Id. at 307–09. 
112 The New Jersey Supreme Court belabors this point several times throughout its 
opinion.  See, e.g., id. at 304, 310, 313. 
113 Id. at 310 (“The law of defamation attempts to strike the proper balance between 
protecting reputation and protecting free speech.” (quoting Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 
972, 978 (N.J. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
114 It is possible that courts in other jurisdictions may decide this issue differently than 
the court in G.D. did.  However, even if post-expungement privacy violations could form the 
basis of a defamation (or other tort) suit, such suits would still be ineffective at addressing 
the root of the problem: that expungement itself is ineffective unless post-expungement 
privacy violations can be prevented.  And post-expungement privacy violations can never be 
prevented with ex post remedies, like those available in civil suits. 
115 G.D., 15 A.3d at 309. 
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even data brokers lawfully obtain that information.
116
  It is true that when a 
conviction is expunged, the information is no longer available to the general 
public through official channels, but it is still legally available from any of 
those other sources.
117
  The G.D. court deftly observes that “[a]ll of the 
beneficial purposes of the expungement statute, and the protections it 
provides, will not allow a person to fully escape from his past.”118  In other 
words, because information from expunged records is readily available, and 
it is currently legal for non-government sources to maintain and provide 
that information, the current common law system will never support 
individual civil actions for post-expungement privacy violations. 
In conclusion, post-expungement privacy violations are uniquely 
unsuited for civil tort suits, both because the information from those records 
is not untrue and because civil suits would have little effect on the 
overarching problem of post-expungement privacy violations.  Without 
being incorporated into a larger statutory scheme, such suits merely place 
small bandages on a gaping wound.  As the New Jersey Supreme Court 
made clear in its observations, the data-broker industry has already grown 
to epic proportions and is proceeding unregulated, so the problem is far too 
big to resolve without going to the source and regulating the companies 
themselves. 
B. WHY STATE STATUTES ARE INADEQUATE 
State regulations are another possible solution to regulate violations of 
post-expungement privacy by data brokers.  In an ideal world, if every state 
simultaneously enacted legislation, this could be a potential solution; but 
because data brokers maintain and distribute records throughout the nation, 
this solution is inadequate. 
Some states have already recognized this problem and attempted to 
address it through regulation of employers and landlords rather than data 
brokers.
119
  Some state regulations, along with some helpful federal 
provisions of Title VII,
120
 prohibit the use of expunged criminal records to 
discriminate against applicants when making employment and housing 
 
116 Id. at 312–13. 
117 Id. at 313. 
118 Id. 
119 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 61–65 (describing the various state laws that 
govern the use of criminal convictions and arrests in making housing and employment 
decisions). 
120 Id. (comparing Title VII’s provisions governing the use of criminal records to those of 
individual state statutes, the states’ statutes being more robust). 




  Other state statutes regulate the dissemination of 
information.
122
  Currently, the only type of state law that directly regulates 
data brokers is laws controlling the dissemination of government 
information to data brokers.  However, even if individual states 
aggressively regulated the dissemination of data, at this point in time, it is 
too little too late.
123
  Since data brokers have already amassed significant 
databases over time, they currently possess millions of records, some of 
which have either already been expunged or might be expunged in the 
future.  Thus, stopping the flow of records to these databases now would do 
nothing to prevent the release of records that they already have. 
Because employers and landlords are more easily reached through 
state police powers than are national data brokers, the current state 
regulations make sense from the states’ perspective.  However, such 
regulation is ineffective for two main reasons.  First, in the contexts of at-
will employment and housing, employers and landlords have nearly free 
rein to choose one applicant over another.  Thus, a law prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of an expunged record would just encourage 
these employers to find a pretextual reason to discriminate against ex-
offender applicants.  After all, “when choosing between an ex-con and a 
person without a criminal past, most employers are likely to choose the 
latter.”124  Second, these regulations do not address the ultimate issue—they 
do not prevent data brokers from releasing expunged records.  It is this 
preventative goal that is most important and needs to be addressed if there 
is any hope of protecting post-expungement privacy. 
An important consideration in dismissing state regulation and 
proposing a federal statutory scheme is whether such a scheme might 
 
121 See id.; Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1348 n.86 and accompanying text. 
122 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 26–27 (“State law largely regulates noncriminal 
justice access to information in the State repositories.  Repositories in 43 states and 
territories responded to a March 2001 SEARCH email survey regarding the extent to which 
they disclose criminal history information to the public (that is, to noncriminal justice users 
such as employers and vendors).  More than two-thirds of the responding repositories 
reported disclosing at least some criminal history information to the public.  Information 
disclosed by the State repositories varies widely, depending upon State law.  Some States 
disclose everything on file, with the exception of sealed or expunged records, while others 
disclose only adult offender conviction data that is less than 10 years old.  Some States 
require the submission of the subject’s fingerprints as a prerequisite for disclosure, while 
others make information available on the basis of name-plus-identifier checks.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
123 However, the federal statute that this Comment proposes should contain provisions 
regulating the dissemination of information. 
124 Hacker, supra note 32, at 471 (footnote omitted). 
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infringe on state sovereignty.
125
  Any time a federal regulatory scheme is 
proposed in an area that is traditionally reserved for the states, federalism 
concerns are inevitably going to surface.  However, in this circumstance, 
even though regulating expungement and the maintenance of criminal 
records is typically reserved to the states, there is a strong argument to be 
made that regulating the data-broker industry is a separate issue capable of 
federal regulation under Commerce Clause authority.
126
 
C. WHY A FEDERAL STATUTE IS SUPERIOR 
First, Congress has the power to regulate both the channels of 
commerce and all things that are in, of, or about interstate commerce.
127
  
There is no doubt that the sale and purchase of criminal records across state 
lines is a part of interstate commerce.  Similarly, the data brokers 
themselves are, in a sense, vehicles for interstate commerce.  Finally, and in 
a much more tangential sense, the fact that the sale and purchase of records 
for the purpose of employment and housing has an effect on the job and 
housing markets could be found under the aggregating effects test
128
 to also 
give Congress the authority to regulate in this area.  Furthermore, the 
FCRA—at least with respect to sovereignty concerns—is already regulating 
a very similar market and paves the way for the type of regulation that this 
Comment proposes.
129
  In sum, it is clear that Congress has the power to 
regulate the data-broker industry through the Commerce Clause. 
With that in mind, a federal regulatory scheme is the best solution for 
 
125 The following is only a brief discussion of federalism concerns as they apply to the 
creation of a federal statute, and this Comment does not purport to present a full analysis of 
the issue. 
126 See infra Part IV.C. 
127 Original authority for commerce power is derived from Article I, Section Eight, 
Clause Three of the United States Constitution, which provides inter alia that Congress shall 
have the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  However, that power has been interpreted by the judiciary to 
include the power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, all things that fall within 
interstate commerce, and those things that substantially affect interstate commerce.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1938); Champion v. 
Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (in, of, and about interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. 1 (1824) (channels of interstate commerce).  For a discussion of the history and 
evolution of Congress’s commerce power, see Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 1 (2010). 
128 See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 1 (first iterations of aggregation); Gonzales 
v. Raich, 541 U.S. 1 (2005) (modern aggregation). 
129 In fact, it has been proposed by some that effective regulation of the data-broker 
industry could even be accomplished through amendments to the FCRA itself.  See 
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 71–72 (analyzing whether the FCRA should be 
amended to reach data brokers). 
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protecting post-expungement privacy rights.  Such a scheme is preferable to 
individual private rights of action.
130
  This is because citizen suits fail to 
effectively address large-scale post-expungement privacy violations.  
Furthermore, an ex post remedy fails to regulate the data-broker industry as 
a whole and thus does nothing to prevent violations from occurring in the 
first place.  Although state statutes have some potential to regulate data 
brokers, on a larger level they will remain ineffective because these 
companies operate nationally and state laws cannot get to the “heart of the 
monster,” so to speak.  However, a federal statutory scheme should still 
pave the way for individual state regulation to come in and fill in the pieces, 
for example with regulations that limit the dissemination of information in 
the future. 
In sum, federal legislation is the most effective way to address post-
expungement privacy because the problem is simply too large.  Data 
brokers’ proprietary databases now span multiple jurisdictions and date 
back many years.
131
  The data-broker industry has already been allowed to 
go on too long threatening the privacy rights of American citizens.  
Accordingly, the only effective way to curb continuing violations is through 
regulation that would apply universally to all data brokers and to all of the 
information in their databases. 
V. PROPOSED AIMS FOR FEDERAL REGULATION 
The final Part of this Comment provides proposed aims and suggested 
provisions for a federal statute designed to protect post-expungement rights.  
This Part considers first provisions designed to place an affirmative duty on 
data brokers themselves, then provisions designed to regulate state and local 
agencies, and finally provisions relating to enforcement. 
A. AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES FOR DATA BROKERS 
The first provision of the statute must define which companies fall 
within the regulatory scheme.  The statute must cover any company that 
profits from the sale of information from public records, including arrests 
and convictions.  The danger with respect to defining the scope of the 
statute is to ensure that all data brokers, as discussed and defined herein, are 





130 However, a citizen-suit provision should still be included within the federal regulatory 
scheme.  See infra Part V. 
131 See supra Part II. 
132 Specifically, the statute must be careful not to implicate newspaper archives or other 
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Once the statute defines which agencies are subject to its provisions, 
the statute must also clearly state that it is limited to expungement of 
misdemeanors and arrests that do not result in conviction.
133
  The reasons 
are similar to this Comment’s purpose in excluding them from its 
discussion: that policy debates and variations in state laws with respect to 
felony, juvenile, and sex-related convictions would complicate federal 
regulation.  Also, because of these variations between state laws, it might be 
inappropriate for federal regulation to step in where some states may have 
chosen not to regulate.  Finally, once the statute has limited the scope of its 
application, it must include provisions that impose affirmative duties 
directly on data brokers. 
1. Prohibition on Willful or Negligent Disclosure 
One provision of the statute must place an affirmative duty on data 
brokers to refrain from either willfully or negligently disclosing incorrect 
information, including the disclosure of convictions that have been 
expunged.  However, the standard for negligent disclosure must be much 
more stringent than those found in the FCRA.  Under the FCRA, companies 
distributing information must only “maintain ‘reasonable’ procedures to 
assure maximum possible accuracy.”134  As discussed in Part III.B, this 
places an extremely light burden on credit-reporting agencies.
135
  The 
burden is so light that they are rarely, if ever, found liable for violations of 
the aforementioned provision.
136
  The provision proposed here should 
require that data brokers exercise reasonable care in ensuring that the 
information they are distributing is correct.  The reasonable care standard 
would be met by performing the regular updates in accordance with Part 
V.A.2 below.  Furthermore, should incorrect information or information 
from expunged records be released due to a failure in updating, a company 
would be considered negligent per se and subject to sanctions as per Part 
V.C below. 
 
websites and publications that, while they may profit from the release of information 
pertaining to criminal records—by the sale of their papers—are not agencies that 
intentionally maintain and distribute criminal records themselves for profit.  Essentially, this 
statute should be limited so as not to require those media sources that report on public trials 
to be held liable for making archives of their past editions available to the public. 
133 See supra Part II. 
134 FCRA, 15 U.S.C § 1681e(b) (2010). 
135 See supra Part III.B. 
136 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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2. Regular Updates 
Next, there must be a provision requiring that brokers regularly update 
their records.  How often these companies should be required to update 
their records would have to depend on a survey of state and local record-
keeping agencies to ascertain how frequently updates can be made 
available.  However, once every six to eight months would be ideal, as 
expungements are granted regularly. 
3. Disposing of Records 
The next provision should require that data brokers dispose of records 
of criminal convictions and arrests after a certain number of years have 
elapsed, perhaps borrowing the seven-year time period that was once 
included in the FCRA.  The policy justification is to curb the proprietary 
databases and to provide an additional incentive for data brokers to seek out 
updates.  One suggestion would be to perform a multi-state survey of the 
average number of years that it takes to expunge different offenses and then 
limit data brokers accordingly.  Regardless, this provision should also be 
retroactive in that it applies to all records that, at the time the statute is 
passed, date back longer than the statutorily prescribed maximum period.  
This retroactivity provision would be incredibly useful in purging the 
already existing databases that pose a potential threat to post-expungement 
privacy in the future. 
4. Standardization of Reporting 
The statute must also set guidelines for the standardization of reporting 
information from criminal records.  Because of variations in the way 
different jurisdictions report and maintain their records and differences in 
local laws, data brokers often “normalize” information using their own 
internal system.
137
  This can result in misinterpretation and subsequent 
misinformation when the final consumer report is produced.
138
  Such 
practices can have harmful effects even for those individuals whose 
criminal records have not been expunged.  For example, a consumer report 
could say nothing more than “drug-related conviction,” which could refer to 
a large range of possible charges from possession to sale and including 
everything in between.  Such potential for confusion and misinformation in 
the current system must be remedied.  Again, the best system for 
normalizing these reports should be developed through comparison of 
current state and local reporting systems.  But with the limited scope of this 
 
137 See supra Part III. 
138 See id. 
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statute, it should not be too difficult to normalize reporting. 
B. REGULATING STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES 
It is also vital that any proposed statutory scheme put some limitations 
on the dissemination of data by state and local agencies.  While such a 
provision might pose some federalism issues, in order to curb the privacy 
violations caused by the data-broker industry, it is important that data 
brokers no longer have the unfettered access to criminal records that they 
have now. 
In order to require that data brokers regularly update their records, any 
state agency providing criminal records should have a concurrent duty to 
regularly update records and provide such updates to data brokers.  While 
directly regulating the practices of state agencies would likely be outside of 
the Commerce Clause authority,
139
 Congress could attach the requirement 
of regular updating as a condition on selling records in interstate commerce.  
Provided that Congress could attach such a condition, possible ways in 
which updates would be available should be determined by, again, 
surveying state and local practices to determine the best possible procedure.  
One suggestion would be for state and local agencies to send updates along 
with invoices as a condition upon the sale of records to data brokers—




Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Comment proposes a set of 
comprehensive enforcement provisions that put the onus of responsibility 
on the data brokers.  These enforcement provisions are necessary to create 
the most effective statute possible. 
1. Monetary Sanctions 
The statute must include a provision providing monetary sanctions that 
attach to any data broker who violates any provision of the statute.  For 
example, any data broker that releases inaccurate information, including 
information about an expunged conviction, will face a fine.  The amount 
should be appropriate to sufficiently deter data brokers from the practice 
 
139 Such regulation would also implicate concerns associated with compelling states to 
take certain actions under Commerce Clause power.  See New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the so-called take-title provision of a federal statute was 
unconstitutional essentially because it amounted to Congress compelling a state to comply 
with federal regulations).  
140 SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 11. 
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and incentivize due diligence.  Furthermore, liability under this section 
should be on a strict liability basis as opposed to by the level of culpability 
of the data broker.  The reason for a strict liability standard with respect to 
monetary sanction is so that whatever administrative agency—likely the 
FTC—is in charge of enforcement will not have to hold hearings to 
determine culpability each time a data broker releases incorrect information.  
Naturally, the dollar amount per infraction would be adjusted down to 
account for a strict liability standard.  Lastly, monetary sanctions should 
also attach, and at a higher amount, for failure to update regularly as per the 
updating procedures recommended herein. 
2. Civil Sanctions 
The statute should also provide civil sanctions for violation of its 
provisions.  One possibility might be revoking or suspending the business 
licenses of those companies that fail to comply with the statutory 
provisions.  Another might be something like an audit, where companies 
consistently in violation would be subject to more stringent review.  
Regardless of what particular sanctions should be in place, having civil 
sanctions on top of monetary penalties would necessarily strengthen the 
enforceability of the statute. 
3. Citizen Suits 
Lastly, it is imperative that the statute contains a citizen suit provision 
that both provides a means for reporting violations of the statute to the 
appropriate administrative agency and allows for private rights of action for 
harm caused by such violations.  Citizens whose rights have been violated 
are without a doubt the most effective policing tools in this type of statutory 
scheme, and so the statute must provide a venue for such citizens to report 
violations to the appropriate administrative body.  The statute should also 
provide for injunctive relief to prevent the release of incorrect information 
before that information causes harm.  This provision would also require that 
data brokers honor expungement orders, and this portion of the statute 
should outline standardized procedures for private citizens to request their 
information be removed from proprietary databases.  Finally, citizens who 
have been harmed by the release of incorrect information should have a 
clear cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages in civil court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has identified a largely unregulated industry that poses 
a threat to the privacy rights of individual citizens.  Accordingly, the goal of 
this Comment is twofold: first, to clearly identify the issue and pave the 
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way for the kind of empirical study that is needed to move this issue into 
Congress’s cognizance; and second, to propose a solution that would help 
protect individuals with expunged records. 
We know that data brokers have amassed significant databases of 
criminal records, spanning many years and across many jurisdictions.  We 
know that they are not currently required to update their records and—at 
least with respect to records that have been expunged—are incentivized not 
to seek out updates from state agencies.  We know that expungements are 
granted every year in all of the states that have expungement statutes.  We 
know that the release of expunged records has had a negative effect on at 
least some American citizens.  We cannot ignore the possibility that data 
brokers are posing a significant threat to post-expungement privacy.  The 
problem of unauthorized or unlawful release of expunged criminal records 
by data brokers can be devastating to the lives of people with expunged 
records.  Something must be done to protect against it.  The federal 
statutory scheme that this Comment proposes would be the first step in the 
right direction towards curbing the negative fallout from the data-broker 
industry. 
 
